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 Over five centuries Cuba’s freedom has been se-
rially denied, usurped, and stifled by Imperial Spain, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union. Beset in turn by impe-
rial control, neocolonial paternalism, and a demeaning com-
munist patronage inimical to freedom, the Cuban people 
have long struggled to attain an independent nation and co-
hesive national identity. The dedicated student of Cuban 
history may tragically, but with good reason, conclude that 
the story of Cuba’s relationship to the world is a series of 
abortive attempts to achieve dignified self-determination.
 The following article is excerpted from a longer 
work and recounts one climactic episode in that story: the 
near-victory of Spanish colonial forces over Cuba’s Libera-
tion Army in the waning months of 1897 and the disastrous 
policy of Reconcentration in which hundreds of thousands of 
Cubans were evacuated from the island’s rural interior. The 
longer work provided a cursory history of the origins of the 
Cuban independence movement, while also tracing the history 
of Cuba’s agricultural and economic development. After out-
lining Cuba’s distinct regional characteristics and their stra-
tegic implications, I introduced Weyler and Gómez as figures 
uniquely suited to command the scorched-earth strategies each 
eventually pursued. I then explored the immediate context of 
Reconcentration: the tenures of Governors General Emilio 
Calleja and Martinez Campos, chronic lawlessness and ban-
ditry in the Cuban countryside, failures of reform in Madrid, 
and the unbalanced relationship between the insurgency’s 
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military and political leadership. This discussion underscores 
the earlier findings that Weyler and Gómez were each com-
mitted to strategies of economic attrition but shows how Wey-
ler’s political support was tenuous compared to that of Gómez.
 This article examines government issued orders as well 
as Weyler’s own personal correspondence to explain the me-
chanics of Reconcentration and why it was poorly suited to the 
war in Cuba. It concludes that even though Reconcentration 
was able to deliver considerable tactical and operational victo-
ries for Weyler, the humanitarian cost of these victories—and 
the international condemnation they drew—ultimately served 
to weaken Spain’s position in Cuba. The article ends as Weyler 
is relieved of command following the assassination of Prime 
Minister Cánovas and before the sinking of the USS Maine—
the two events which provide the proximate causes for the Span-
ish-American War and Spain’s eventual expulsion from Cuba.
 Weyler did not mince words when he assumed com-
mand in February of 1896: the “valor, energy, and patriotism” 
of the loyalists had delivered Cuba in 1878 and it he was 
adamant that it would do so again.1 He would command the 
war against this new insurgency with the same brutality and 
vehemence with which he, as a young man, had fought the 
old—never mind that last time Cuba had been left in smolder-
ing ruins. Weyler correctly understood that lack of support for 
independence among central and western Cubans during the 
Ten Years War had hamstrung the insurgency. Regional dif-
ferences in racial composition, economic organization, and 
proximity to Spanish-dominated cities had effectively divided 
the island into east and west, turning what might have been a 
swift and unifying revolution into a long and protracted civ-
il war. In the decades since the Ten Years War José Martí’s 
rhetoric had bolstered the intellectual and emotional case for 
Cuban independence but western Cubans continued to fear the 
consequences that independence would spell for Cuba’s eco-
nomic and racial order. For all of the work Martí had done in 
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the interwar years writing in support of a free and democratic 
Cuba, his egalitarian racial vision for Cuba’s future mattered 
little to the wealthy white factions of the colony’s west who 
stood to lose the most from economic and racial rebalancing.
 Máximo Gómez understood this self-interested line 
of thinking and devised a strategy to win over Western sup-
port—or to at least deprive Spain of such support—by attack-
ing the planter property which formed the basis of plantation 
society. In the early months of their campaign Gómez and 
Maceo drove westward torching sugarcane fields and destroy-
ing refineries. Gómez’s theory of victory was simple but bru-
tal: if Spain valued Cuba as a colony because of the value it 
produced for the metropole, then independence would come 
once that which produced value for Spain had been destroyed. 
This approach had the benefit of removing race relations from 
the center of the revolutionary project—something which had 
hobbled Manuel de Cespedes—and allowed the focus of insur-
rectionist efforts to directly target the source of Spain’s eco-
nomic and political strength on the island: Cuba’s planter elite. 
 Gómez had thus taken on a strategy of 19th century eco-
nomic warfare. “Blessed is the torch” he wrote in 1897, extol-
ing the virtues of the insurrection’s most efficacious weapon.2 
The damages were staggering. By August,1897 Spanish of-
ficials found that in Santa Clara alone over 400 hundred farms 
had been burned by insurgents at a cost of nearly half a million 
pesos in farm property and crop value.3 Gómez’s scorched earth 
campaign was so effective at destroying the west’s agricul-
tural base because of how impossible it was to defend against. 
Late in the season, when the sugar stalks’ leafy husks were at 
their driest, all that was needed to set a field ablaze was a few 
torches lighting up the corner of a given field. Therefore, even 
Weyler’s reinforced army could do little to protect all of the 
Cuban sugar latifundia against Gómez’s dedicated irregulars.
 Sugar burning was not a wholly new phenomenon in the 
Cuban countryside. In 1869 once the initial energy of his revo-
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lutionary moment had dissipated Cespedes had sanctified the 
burning of sugarcane and the destruction of sugar.4 However, 
Cespedes’ forces never made it far enough east to harm any of the 
island’s major sugar producing regions. Similarly, in the years 
between the two wars organized gangs of bandits ran extortion 
schemes in which plantation owners were obliged to pay for 
‘protection’ from would-be arsonists, but, like Cespedes, these 
bandits could not operate freely in the island’s west and so they 
inflicted limited damage.5 The decision to rely on field burning 
in 1895 would thus seem like a predictable and not wholly un-
manageable threat to Spanish rule. However, as the paucity of 
Spanish troops garrisoned on the island at the war’s outbreak 
suggests, in 1895 Spanish rule was not what it once was, and 
a uniquely devastating set of circumstances allowed Gómez 
to wreak unprecedented havoc on Cuba’s colonial economy. 
 The first and most obvious was the sheer scale of the 
forces now at the insurgency’s disposal, and the degree to which 
the insurgency had penetrated into Cuba’s fertile western re-
gions prior to Spanish mobilization under Weyler. Unlike other 
commodity crops like wheat or rice—which are both shelf-sta-
ble once harvested—sugar requires extensive processing after 
harvest to deliver a durable, market-ready product. Therefore, 
once sugarcane is harvested, planters must race to bring their 
sugar to a mill lest it ferment and spoil the cane’s chances of 
becoming sugar. Burning a sugar field alone was not sufficient 
to destroy its commercial value—in fact burning a sugar field 
is one way to prepare it for harvest. However, by removing the 
stalk’s protective husk burning sugarcane begins the process 
of fermentation which invariably leads to its spoilage. If sug-
arcane is not harvested and milled within eight to ten days of 
being burnt it will not yield  sugar.6 However, as long as plan-
tation owners could rely on their workers to complete the har-
vest and authorities could be trusted to provide public safety so 
the crop can get to market a burnt field need not spell ruin. As 
a consequence, the small-scale hit and run arsons carried out 
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by insurgent guerilla forces during the Ten Years War made no 
discernable impact on the production of sugar—and by exten-
sion Cuba’s value as a colonial dominion. In fact Cuban sugar 
output rose in 1870, the year after Cespedes had called upon 
his disorganized guerillas to burn the island’s cane fields.7
 Gómez energetically pursued the direct assault on 
Spanish sugar which Cespedes had only reluctantly sanc-
tioned. Moreover, whereas Cespedes’ revolution had waited 
seven years to stumble across the Juraco-Maron trocha to 
strike at the pro-Spanish west, Gómez ordered his two-column 
invasion of the west within six months of arriving in Cuba. 
Once Gómez and Maceo rode out of the east they avoided 
pitched battles with Spanish regulars and instead directed 
their forces’ energy towards the destruction of plantation land, 
sugar mills, and whatever other infrastructure was of value to 
the Spanish colonial apparatus. By seizing the initiative and 
taking advantage of Campos’ ineptitude Gómez had thrown 
the weight of an organized military force behind the brutal 
tactics of bandits. During the Ten Years War only small disor-
ganized insurgent parties managed to cross the Juraco-Moron 
trocha and could only harry the fringes of Cuba’s sugar re-
gions. Small in number and limited in reach they could neither 
destroy enough fields nor sow enough disorder to prevent the 
salvaging of burnt crops by responsive planters largely pro-
tected by Spanish authorities. However, by 1895 the calculus 
had shifted squarely in the insurgent’s favor. Not only were 
Gómez and Maceo moving deeper into the west and with more 
men, but they faced little in the way of organized opposition.
 Thus, the second and most consequential feature of 
the new insurgent campaign had nothing to do with Gómez’s 
military acumen or Martí’s oratorical genius, but rather with 
Spanish imperial decline. Cuba’s rural regions had grown so 
lawless in the interwar period that by 1895 it was difficult for 
leaders in Havana to know if the increasing unrest in the east 
was revolution or just more banditry. Gómez had not anticipat-
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ed this confusion but his expediency in assembling his forces 
and moving decisively into the west capitalized on it neverthe-
less. Time had been the enemy of the insurgents during the Ten 
Years War, but Gómez’s early successes allowed him to sow 
disorder and destruction far into the west, forcing the govern-
ment in Havana onto its back foot. On January 22nd 1896, five 
days after Campos had been recalled by Canovas and less than 
three weeks before Weyler would assume command, Maceo’s 
column marched unopposed into Mantua -- a small township 
at the westernmost end of Pinar del Rio.8 It had taken Maceo’s 
invasion column of 1500 men just under one hundred days to 
travel half the length of Cuba—a distance of nearly 400 miles. 
 Maceo’s average pace of four miles a day was slow, 
but speed is not necessary when one’s objective is steady and 
comprehensive destruction. Once Gómez and Maceo had de-
feated and out maneuvered Spanish forces at the battle of Mal 
Tiempo on the 15th of December 1895, the insurgent com-
manders were able to progress westward unimpeded.9 Since 
the key to insurgent victory, Gómez had reasoned, lay in show-
ing the island’s powerful planter class that the Spanish could 
not protect their economic interests, the invasion of the west 
did not aim to capture cities or to achieve a decisive military 
victory.10 As commander of the lead invasion column Maceo’s 
mission was to destroy everything which the planters had 
hoped Spain would protect and avoid the costly distractions 
of taking cities or holding territory. Maceo’s column mean-
dered westward through the provinces of Santa Clara, Matan-
zas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio burning through vast tracts of 
open farmland while merely singeing the edges of the well de-
fended cities and towns. Meanwhile, by razing the foundation 
of Cuban economic life the insurgents were simultaneously 
precipitating an unemployment crisis which swelled their own 
ranks. Hundreds of peasants, now unable to farm their em-
ployer’s burnt fields, joined the invasion column as it swept 
westward.11 The tendency, shared by contemporaneous Span-
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ish loyalists and subsequent Cuban historians, to conflate the 
approximately 1500 soldiers Maceo had led into the west with 
the hundreds (if not thousands) of Cuban peasants who would 
eventually join him is understandable.12 The volunteers who 
joined Maceo west of the trocha were poorly disciplined and 
deserted often, and even though an estimated 40,000 would 
serve in the Liberation Army, at no point would Maceo or Gó-
mez have more than a few thousand under their command.13 
Thus the western invasion of 1895-1896 began as a well 
thought out military campaign executed by commanders with 
a strategic vision for how to unseat Spanish rule, but slowly 
devolved into something resembling highly organized bandit-
ry. And while the invasion succeeded in completing the first 
cross-island military campaign in Cuban history as 1895 drew 
to a close it soon became apparent that centuries of Spanish 
colonialism would not be undone by one spoiled sugar harvest. 
 The new Spanish strategy under Weyler, while rooted 
in an economic calculus similar to Gómez’s, depended on the 
inertia of Spanish rule and the willingness of the metropole 
to think with its heart and not with its brain. As Campos had 
noted in his letters to Canovas and his cabinet, the strategy 
of Reconcentration which he believed might deliver victory 
for Spain would come at an intolerable cost. While his ap-
peals to Christian principles suggest his motivation was hu-
manitarian, it is equally true that any policy of forced pop-
ulation resettlement would be incredibly costly, in terms of 
both blood and treasure, to the Spanish government. The fi-
nancial burden of Reconcentration would arise not only from 
the cost of the troops required to implement and enforce 
such a scheme, but from the revenues lost from depopulat-
ing the regions most important to Cuba’s agricultural produc-
tion. However, for Spanish conservatives such as Weyler and 
Cánovas, the rationale for fighting over Cuba was not at all 
about the money but rather imperial pride. So, motivated by 
a desire to maintain the remnants of Spanish Empire, Wey-
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ler set about implementing the Reconcentration strategy.
 On the 16th of February, less than a week into his com-
mand in Havana, Weyler issued his first Reconcentration orders 
for the eastern provinces of Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Prin-
cipe, as well as the district of Sancti-Spiritus.14 The inclusion 
of Sancti-Spiritus—which lies on the easternmost edge of the 
province of Santa Clara fifty miles west of the Jucaro-Moron 
trocha—was a notable public admission of a Spanish defeat. 
Detailed in his order were directions that all Cubans “relocate 
themselves nearby division, brigade, column, or other army 
command post, and to gather in their town squares within 
eight days of the orders’ publication with their identification 
papers.”15 Once relocated to the cities Cubans were not to trav-
el back into the countryside without the express permission of 
their local military or civil authority.16 These provisions, which 
would become the standard for Weyler’s subsequent orders, 
also entitled field commanders to make use of the resources 
left behind in the countryside by evacuated peasants and thus 
laid the foundation for more serious seizures in the future.17
 Along with his Reconcentration order Weyler pub-
lished a slew of additional wartime restrictions on the press 
and civil society. This second order criminalized a wide range 
of seditious activity from tampering with Spanish army ra-
tions to sending subversive messages via messenger pigeon 
and made civilians who violated its terms subject to the code 
of military justice—a move which made it easier for army 
units in the field to summarily execute suspected insurgents.18 
Given that news of Weyler’s arrival had signaled a more ag-
gressive commitment to the Spanish war effort many Cu-
bans might have anticipated these new measures. However, 
for the thousands of rural families who lived in Cuba’s far 
east away from telegraph lines or serviceable roads, one can 
only imagine that the first time they heard of Reconcentration 
was when Spanish soldiers came to their homes to enforce it.
 In some respects, Weyler’s order had only formal-
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ized a process which had already begun as a consequence of 
Gómez’s scorched earth strategy. While many peasant farm-
ers had joined the insurgency’s invasion columns many more 
were left displaced and dispossessed. Unable to earn a living 
in a countryside which Gómez had decided would produce 
nothing of value, rural Cubans had already begun to flood the 
island’s urban centers. The depopulation of the countryside 
by both Weyler and Gómez led to steep drops in Cuba’s ag-
ricultural output. Drops in Cuban sugar and tobacco output 
was a serious blow to planters and the Spanish tax authority 
but was ultimately survivable. What was not survivable were 
the cuts to food production. It is a curious and consequential 
fact of Cuban history that despite rice being the center of the 
Cuban diet for centuries, Cuba has almost always relied on 
imports to meet domestic demand.19 Thus, rural depopula-
tion coupled with restrictions placed by both sides on the sale 
of foods between Spanish and insurgent held areas sent re-
gions already vulnerable to food insecurity into full-fledged 
famine. Livestock, invaluable as a durable and transportable 
source of calories, thus became a valuable military asset. 
By May, 1896 Spanish authorities in Santa Clara had begun 
tracking the transport of cows, horses, and pigs and impos-
ing stiff fines on farmers found to be herding without direct 
permission from military, as opposed to civilian, authorities.20
 This squeeze on resources was exactly what Weyler had 
envisioned when he began Reconcentrating each Cuban prov-
ince in succession.  In a private, handwritten, order circulated 
to his military subordinates Weyler insisted that his officers, 
“dedicate their primary attention to the destruction of house-
holds in areas frequented by the enemy or in places where the 
owners do not present themselves with valid identification.”21 
He went on, instructing that wherever Spanish units were 
marching they were to ensure that they left behind no livestock 
or crops which the insurgents could utilize. “In summary” he 
concluded, “what I expect [from my forces] is that they help 
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to take from the various provinces as quickly as possible all of 
the resources which the enemy can make use of, so that they 
might find themselves insufficiently protected and obliged, for 
lack of access to food, to be beaten or to surrender.”22 This 
letter, written on the 8th of January 1897, highlighted what 
had become an important shift in Weyler’s strategy. In addi-
tion to Reconcentrating the island’s peasants Weyler had spent 
much of his first year chasing down Gómez’s and Maceo’s 
armies. So, while the objective of defeating the insurgent’s 
in battle was never far from Weyler’s mind, this letter shows 
that Weyler also understood the economic forces at play in 
this war. Indeed, just as Gómez and Maceo had calculated that 
their route to victory lay in starving Spain of sugar, Weyler had 
settled upon the similar path of starving Cuba into submission.
 However, during this time there appeared a new chal-
lenge which Weyler had not appreciated, nor one which his 
previous service in Cuba prepared him for: pandemic. The de-
liberate starving of vast portions of the population and the forc-
ible relocation of the same into hastily constructed bohios on 
the outskirts of major cities soon led to a truly horrendous pub-
lic health crisis. The inevitable human suffering these arrange-
ments invited remained with one Spanish soldier decades later,23
 
One afternoon, accompanied by other office workers, 
I wanted to see the real conditions of that appalling 
agglomeration of people all crammed together. And the 
shock and pity and indignation its horrendous scenes 
aroused in me was so intense that even now, sixty-two years 
later, my Christian soul still throbs with painful vibrations 
triggered by the same principled protests of moral 
indignation. That piling up of human beings was a scene 
out of Dante. Beaten down, weeping, half-naked, and sick 
for the most part; some were dying, others lacking the most 
essential things for survival.
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Figure 1: An aerial photograph of a reconcentrated town, 
presumably taken from a guard tower or similar structure. 
The caption reads, “The town of Dimas or San Pedro de 
Maurias, in formation, during the time of Reconcentration.”
Cuban National Archives.
Figure 2: Cuban peasants pose for a photograph with 
their livestock in a reconcentrated town. Cuban National 
Archives.
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 While the insurgent press-machine worked hard to de-
liver photographs of starved women and children to Ameri-
can newspapers, few photos of the Cuban Reconcentration 
settlements exist today. However, two photographs from ar-
chives in Havana provide modern historians with an important 
glimpse into life as a reconcentrado. In reconcentrated towns, 
humble bohios made of palm fronds and wooden planks seem 
to have been the predominant form of shelter. Notably ab-
sent are signs of any public above ground water infrastruc-
ture such as a canal or water tower. In an era when indoor 
plumbing was a luxury even in wealthy nations, the lack of 
such infrastructure can reasonably be understood to imply an 
absence of any system of public water supply or drainage.26 
A second photo which lacked any identifying notes or de-
scription, simply captured a ground-level view of a group of 
reconcentrados. Accompanying the reconcentrados are two 
large cows, pointing to another hidden horror of Reconcen-
tration: the untold thousands of animals that must have ac-
companied the reconcentrados into the camps. Small farmers, 
uprooted and forced to leave their farms, would have brought 
with them their most valuable transportable assets, livestock.
 While these animals were incredibly valuable as stores 
of food in regions which had ceased producing food for Span-
iards and Cubans alike, the concentrating of so many animals 
in such close proximity created health hazards which only ex-
acerbated the already unfolding crisis.27 The best evidence for 
this comes in the form of direct orders Weyler issued to loyal-
ist civil authorities via pro-Spanish newspapers. In December 
of 1896 Weyler declared that he had “observed with disgust 
the insufficient maintenance of fortified towns,”28 which he 
noted had caused “a considerable number of sicknesses among 
civilian population as well as among the soldiers who guard 
and pass through the town.” His order went on to, among oth-
er things, penalize the public discarding of animal carcasses 
within residential areas, and to prohibit bathing upstream from 
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where drinking water is drawn. Even more telling is an order 
which was issued just over two weeks before Weyler’s by the 
Mayor of Havana Antonio Quesada banning the bathing of 
horses and mules in the city’s freshwater streams.29 The un-
cleanliness of such practices is readily apparent, even before 
one considers the roughly 50 pounds of urine and manure a 
single horse produces daily.30 These orders—troubling be-
cause they reveal what basic acts of sanitation were not being 
done—also reveal the difficulties the Spanish were facing as a 
ruling regime responsible for ensuring the public welfare. That 
the most senior Spanish official on the island, and the Mayor 
of the island’s largest city were forced to involve themselves in 
order to remedy basic public health issues, speaks to the inept-
itude of the Spanish law and authority at the most local level. 
 Hungry and immunocompromised farmers living in 
close proximity with their draft animals soon fell ill from dys-
entery and similar gastro-intestinal illnesses.31 The transmis-
sion of typhus also surged in the reconcentrados where close 
quarters and Weyler’s restrictions on the sale of fresh clothing 
worked in tandem to aid the spread of the lice-born malady.32 
However, it was the inability to counter the spread of yellow 
fever—known as ‘the black vomit’ to Spanish soldiers for the 
dark bloody mucus produced by terminal patients—which 
might be considered the most deadly consequence of Weyler’s 
Reconcentration policy.33 By the time Weyler assumed com-
mand in Havana the Cuban physician Dr. Carlos Finlay had 
known for almost fifteen years that the Aëdes aegypti mos-
quito was likely responsible for the transmission of the yellow 
fever.34 In experiments which he began in 1881 Dr. Finlay had 
successfully used the aegypti mosquito to infect willing Jesuit 
priests with the yellow fever virus which had demonstrated 
that mosquitoes, and not the bloody excretions of patients, 
were the primary vectors of transmission.35 However Dr. Fin-
lay’s findings were not widely published in 1896 and he did 
not offer his services to the Spanish government. Instead, once 
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hostilities between Spain and the United States had erupted 
in 1898, he would go on share his findings with Major Walter 
Reed of the U.S. Army Medical Corps.36 Consequently, both 
the reconcentrados and Spanish in garrison suffered grievous 
losses to a disease they could neither cure nor comprehend.
 The effect of disease on Spanish soldiers guarding 
Cuba’s towns and cities is worth additional emphasis. The 
loss of tens of thousands of Cuban reconcentrados to illness 
was not inherently disastrous to a Governor General who 
had already committed himself to a policy of starving Cu-
bans into submission.37 The deaths of tens of thousands of 
Spanish soldiers and the incapacitation of thousands more 
posed a great risk to Weyler’s strength as Reconcentration 
moved into effect. Reconcentration, which was a theoreti-
cally sound if inhumane strategy, thus struggled immensely 
under the weight of the conditions which it itself had created.
 Weyler had conceived of Reconcentration as a strategy 
to deny the insurgency the material support of the populace, 
but he had not anticipated that the burden of relocating and 
guarding the island’s civilians would nearly break the forces 
under his command. From the spring of 1895 to the summer 
of 1898 Spain sent over 200,000 soldiers to Cuba, of whom 
one fifth to one fourth perished from disease.38 Poorly ra-
tioned and underequipped, as time wore on the Spanish Army 
in Cuba began to look more and more like the reconcentra-
dos they were guarding. Spanish army hospitals located in the 
same diseased towns as the Cubans and their farm animals 
soon became focal points of disease themselves. Ignorance of 
the aëdes aegypti mosquito’s role in viral transmission meant 
that soldiers suffering from malaria or yellow fever were not 
separated from other patients, nor were precautions taken to 
reduce mosquito populations—such as draining nearby bodies 
standing water. A soldier who had been treated for dysentery 
in a Spanish hospital and discharged as healthy might have 
returned to his post only to succumb to yellow fever a few 
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days later, thereby exposing the rest of his unit to infection. 
It is important to stress that this was a problem particular to 
and endemic in the Spanish army as a consequence of Wey-
ler’s Reconcentration policy and Spanish army incompetence, 
and not simply a consequence of late 19th century tropical 
warfare. Neither the insurgent forces nor the American forces 
who fought in Cuba during the war experienced fatalities to 
disease at anywhere near the 20% to 25% the Spanish suf-
fered. The insurgents only operated where they could, beyond 
the reach of Spanish authorities and therefore well away from 
the disease-ridden reconcentrados. Moreover, the insurgent 
strategy of sugarcane and plantation destruction necessarily 
meant that Maceo and Gómez’s forces were constantly on the 
move and were never exposed to potentially infected popu-
lations for long periods of time. Finally, the insurgency was 
overwhelmingly made up of native-born Cubans and consisted 
of disproportionately more Afro-Cubans, whose populations 
have greater resistance to yellow fever and malaria.39 How-
ever naturally occurring resistance to tropical disease was 
not a necessary condition for armies hoping to avoid massive 
loss of life. Thanks to a proactive command attentive to the 
risk of outbreak, the well-resourced and disciplined American 
forces in Cuba lost a mere 3% of their soldiers to disease.40
 Reconcentration thus not only precipitated a humani-
tarian crisis, but also left a festering self-inflicted wound on 
the Spanish Army. Weyler, however, seemed undisturbed. In 
his memoirs of the events of late 1896—the period in which 
he issued his orders pertaining to public health and sanita-
tion—the issues of living conditions in the reconcentrados are 
conspicuously absent. Instead, Weyler was preoccupied with 
seeking out, trapping, and destroying Maceo’s invasion col-
umn which had been wreaking havoc in Pinar del Rio since 
January of that year.41 Over the spring and summer of 1896 
Weyler’s engineers constructed a new defensive line which 
would bisect the island from North to South along the bor-
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der of the provinces of Pinar del Rio and Havana. Spanning 
less than twenty miles from Mariel in the north and Majana 
in the south, this new trocha sealed off Pinar del Rio—and 
along with it Maceo and his army—from Havana and Gó-
mez. Meanwhile, even as the heat and rain of Cuba’s sum-
mer months left tens of thousands of Weyler’s soldiers fever-
ish and immobilized in garrison, Spanish forces had moved 
eastward from Havana pushing Gómez out of Havana and 
Santa Clara provinces all the way to Puerto Principe. In May 
of 1896 Gómez was forced back across the Juraco-Moron 
Trocha bringing the invasion of the west into its final stag-
es.42 By the fall of 1896 Weyler had reconstituted the Juraco-
Moron Trocha and built the new Mariel-Majana Trocha with 
the two most skilled insurgent commanders—and the armies 
they commanded—held back on either side. That Weyler had 
managed all this while large portions of his force were inca-
pacitated due to illness underscores the weakness of the Liber-
ation Army several months removed from its early successes. 
Years later Weyler recalled how he anticipated a reinvigora-
tion of his troops once the cooler winter arrived in late 1896, 43
 
 
Eventually the winds came, and in early December Wey-
ler’s forces pinned down Maceo’s trapped invasion col-
umn and killed the Bronze Titan himself, scattering his 
troops, and dealing the greatest blow to the insurgency yet. 
Once November came the rains had subsided substantially, 
but the heat pressed on, as did the sanitary conditions, if 
things have improved it has not been enough to prevent new 
cases of yellow fever, and we have not yet felt the northern 
winds which were to be our panacea, since a change in the 
atmospheric conditions could give a significant jolt to all 
operations in Pinar del Rio.
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 With Maceo dead and his column disbanded, insurgen-
cy operations west of the Juraco-Moron trocha resembled the 
same low-grade agitation which had existed before the war. 
Gómez’s army was confined to Puerto Principe and Santiago in 
the east and Weyler was slowly but surely positioning himself 
to regain control there as well. On New Year’s Day 1897 Cuba 
looked much the same as it had 25 years before in 1872. The 
insurgency had demonstrated the weakness of Spain’s colonial 
government by razing plantations from Santiago to Pinar del 
Rio, but Gómez’s strategy of total war rested on the somewhat 
paradoxical belief that Cubans from east to west would rally to 
the cause once he had destroyed their farms and liberated them 
of any material allegiance to Spain. Even if plantation Cubans 
Figure 3: A Spanish military map depicting the province of Pinar 
del Rio. Weyler’s new trocha spanned the province’s Eastern 
border with the province of Havana. Cuban National Archives.
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were not won over by banditry, by destroying everything of 
value to Spain in Cuba a scorched earth insurgency it was rea-
soned that Spain would eventually cut her losses and leave 
behind the ashes. Had Spain behaved rationally, Gómez’s 
strategy might have worked, but even before the outbreak of 
war in 1895 it would have been unwise to bet big on Cuba, 
and Gómez might have fought differently had he seen why. 
The establishment of the first European sugar beet refineries 
in the early 19th century slowly began a countdown whose 
culmination would be the end of Spain’s Cuban sugar monop-
oly. By 1890 beet sugar accounted for nearly half of world’s 
supply, and even in Spain farmers were being encouraged to 
grow sugar beets—surely there could be no more prophetic 
sign of impending Cuban obsolescence than sacks of raw sug-
ar branded with the words Hecho en España!44 So why then 
would Spain bother to fight for Cuba, why pour tens of thou-
sands of men and hundreds of millions of pesos into an island 
it had considered granting autonomy only three years prior?
 There was no rational answer, only blinding national-
ism and a lust for lost empire can explain Cánovas’ obstinance 
and Weyler’s fervor. Gómez’s strategy had incorrectly as-
sumed that his adversary would weigh the cost of war against 
the diminishing value of Cuba as a colony. In a letter Wey-
ler wrote in late July 1896, he addressed the questions posed 
to him by Spain’s foreign minister about what he expected 
would be necessary for the war effort. In a thirteen-page letter 
adorned with Weyler’s flourished signature, the new Capitan 
General explained that a serious investment of money and men 
would be needed to bring the situation in Cuba back under 
control. “It is difficult to answer your questions precisely” he 
wrote, “but it is certain that in order to fund the exigencies 
of the current and planned campaigns the bank of this island 
will need (at a minimum) during this year to receive ninety-
six million pesos, but that that could rise to one hundred and 
twelve million if an additional 40,000 men are sent.”45 In a 
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move which directly contradicted the insurgency’s assump-
tion that Spain’s interests in Cuba lay with her plantations, 
in May of 1896 Weyler effectively requisitioned all of the 
grain west of Santa Clara by requiring that all farmers empty 
their silos and deliver the contents to the nearest Spanish gar-
rison.46 Four days later Weyler banned the export of tobac-
co.47 These publicly issued orders should have raised concerns 
amongst the insurgents about the strategy of targeting Spain’s 
export agriculture. Weyler evidently cared little about the eco-
nomic justifications for future empire, as did his boss Prime 
Minister Cánovas who, as we have seen, was willing to wa-
ger untold lives and gold to hold onto the ever-faithful isle.
 In 1897 with Gómez safely confined to the east, the 
most serious threat to continued Spanish rule in Cuba victory 
was not an organized insurgency, but an inability to see the 
war through. Conditions on the island were dire and a sig-
nificant investment of Spanish treasure would be required 
to keep even the loyalists from starvation. In major Spanish 
controlled cities, the instability of war led to speculation in 
paper currency, bullion, and basic foodstuffs. As inflation 
skyrocketed authorities in Havana instituted a series of price 
controls on beef, rice, oil, soap, and more.48 Weyler even is-
sued an order mandating the usage of paper currency instead 
of gold in all transactions—except when paying debts to the 
Spanish government.49 Since the insurgency had no way to 
prevent Spanish ships from resupplying Spanish held-areas 
with much needed rations, supplies, and soldiers there were 
little leaders like Gómez could do on their own to prevent 
the eventual recapturing of the insurgent-held east. Ameri-
can intervention against Spain was by no means certain in 
the Spring and Summer of 1897, and the possibility of a rec-
onciliation and autonomy agreement with Madrid was even 
less likely so long as Cánovas and the conservatives remained 
in power. As Weyler’s armies worked their way east, slowly 
and brutally reasserting Spanish rule, it seemed as if only an 
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act of God would save the insurgency from total destruction.
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